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FEATURE COMMENT: Katrina’s
Continuing Impact On Procurement—
Emergency Procurement Powers In
H.R. 3766
Editor’s Note: Reps. Kenny Marchant (R-Texas)
and Tom Davis (R-Va.), Chairman of the House
Government Reform Committee, introduced H.R.
3766 September 14 to streamline procurements
during national emergencies declared by Congress
or the president. The bill would give agencies increased flexibility to use other than competitive
procedures when the agency head determines they
are necessary to respond to the emergency. In addition, the measure treats disaster-related procurements as “commercial,” thus exempting them from
many statutory restrictions. The bill would also
authorize the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to accept volunteer services.
In announcing the bill, Davis said that when
the Government responds to an emergency, “time
is of the essence.” “This legislation will allow federal agencies, during national emergencies or
natural disasters, to quickly acquire the goods
and services they need to assist relief and recovery efforts.” “It’s a common sense measure to help
us cut through the red tape and get help to people
who desperately deserve it,” Davis said. In the following FEATURE COMMENT, Professors Christopher
Yukins and Joshua Schwartz of The George
Washington University Law School offer their critique of the proposed legislation.
*
*
*
Professor Yukins—On balance, at least
H.R. 3766 offers a better approach to reconstruction than the second supplemental appropriation
4-029-666-7

for Hurricane Katrina relief, which raised the “micropurchase” threshold to $250,000 for relief-related purchases. That earlier legislation ripped what are likely
to be billions of dollars in small contracts out of the
procurement system, without competition, transparency, or regard for socioeconomic requirements.
Rep. Davis’ proposed bill, in contrast, takes a
more measured approach. Unfortunately, H.R. 3766
would eliminate competition for “emergency”related procurement. H.R. 3766 would, however,
leave most of the basic mechanisms of transparency
(notice of award, for example) in place, and would
honor most of the socioeconomic goals built into our
procurement system.
That’s not to say, however, that the bill isn’t troubling.
First, the bill would forever open a large and permanent gap in our procurement law. Whenever a “national emergency” or “major disaster” was declared—
and goodness knows that’s an open-ended
contingency—agencies could embark on sole-source
procurement.
Our experience with Hurricane Katrina so far
teaches us that this could amount to many billions of
dollars in sole-source procurement. Nothing I have
seen so far in reports from Katrina relief, however,
indicates that we do, indeed, need to destroy competition in order to rebuild the Gulf Coast.
Prudence suggests that we await more information from the relief effort so that we can tell whether
this sweeping exception from competition is, in fact,
needed. In assessing the data from the field, we need
to be mindful that, without competition, the procurement system generally lacks most independent guarantors of best value.
The other provisions in H.R. 3766 are also troubling because they would treat all disaster-related procurement as “commercial,” and thus would exempt
that procurement, whether appropriately or not, from
a broad array of laws that protect the Government.
As with the recent second supplemental appropriation,
the proposed legislation would exempt relief-related
procurement from cost standards, truth-in-negotiation
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disclosure requirements and from other laws that
ensure that the Government pays a fair price for a
quality product.
What’s interesting, though, is to turn the proposed law on its head: Maybe the bill’s insight is
not that these exemptions will facilitate recovery,
but rather that massive reconstruction cannot be
done without these exemptions.
Traditionally, commercial companies have
steered clear of serious federal contracting precisely
because of the onerous protections this law would
sweep away. Most commercial companies simply
lack the patience or infrastructure to deal with the
Government’s often maddening array of procurement requirements.
In a massive reconstruction, however, which in
essence “federalizes” much of the economic production across a large geographic area, perhaps these
proposed legal exemptions are inevitable. If most
of the firms in that reconstruction zone are, in fact,
going to be swept up into federal procurement,
maybe we have to carve out huge exemptions from
our procurement system’s requirements.
Before we take that drastic step, however, let’s review the news from the Katrina relief effort, to see
whether it is, indeed, necessary to force open such
huge gaps in the protections our procurement system affords.
*
*
*
Professor Schwartz—When I first read H.R.
3766, the question that came to mind was simply:
Why? For there is no adequate practical justification for a sharp move away from competition or
transparency either in the emergency situation on
the Gulf Coast and in New Orleans, or in the pressing need for a massive reconstruction. Radical departures from basic principles of our federal procurement law simply are not needed to make viable
a massive federal reconstruction effort. Instead,
they should be viewed as the product of a thoroughgoing opposition to, or at least a radical questioning of, the cardinal tenets of the federal procurement system as we have known it. Those principles
are simply that competition and transparency are
the best guarantors for achieving best value, efficiency, integrity and fairness among contractors in
the operation of our procurement system and in the
expenditure of taxpayer dollars. Before returning
to that point, let me offer my overview of the big
picture as I see it.
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The proposals embodied in H.R. 3766 represent
another important, and regrettable, step in the radical deregulation of federal procurement that has
been occurring piecemeal and in fits and starts over
the last decade and a half. Ultimately, I can find
no justification for such a far-reaching deregulation.
This is true even though it is equally clear to me
that many of the significant steps taken to reform
our procurement system in the past few decades
were long overdue and well-justified. To understand
my perspective, which might at first seem contradictory, it is vital to note, initially, that the project
of radical deregulation of Federal Government procurement is completely different in purpose and effect from the efforts to lighten the burden of Government regulation of private industry mostly seen
in the Republican administrations of the last quarter century:
First, what is being deregulated here is Government itself, not private industry.
Second, the very body of regulation being discarded is designed primarily to protect the interests of taxpayers and the private sector (including
contractors), not to limit the autonomy of private
decision makers.
Third, the corpus of Government procurement
regulation being discarded was itself founded on the
objective of securing to Government and to taxpayers, on the most efficient and economical terms
achievable, the best goods and services available
from the private sector to meet the needs of the public. In our traditional system of procurement law,
these goods and services are secured from the private sector instead of being produced by Government employees precisely because of our strong
belief in the superiority of the private sector for
such purposes. We hold that the Government can
achieve better results at lower cost for the public
by making appropriate recourse to the private marketplace. Moreover, and most importantly, the traditional system of federal procurement law in the
U.S. regulates the Government’s procurement practices, insisting on competition and transparency
because of an empirically based belief—reinforced
by our nation’s strong free market ideology—that
competition and transparency offer the best assurance that we will, indeed, achieve these critically
important objectives:
• best value for the Government and the taxpayer;
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• maximal efficiency in the expenditure of
scarce taxpayer resources;
• honesty and integrity in the administration
of our procurement system; and;
• a level playing field for, and fairness in the
treatment of, competing contractors.
Given all this, why would one be predisposed to
deregulating the process of Government procurement? And why, in the name of crisis management
would one want to suspend the normal procedures
that have generally brought us these important good
things? (Indeed, our classical procurement system
has been so successful that third-world nations and
former Soviet-style economies clamor to learn how
to copy it.) The effect of the sweeping deregulation
of Federal Government procurement is fundamentally different from, and antithetical to, that of the
last quarter century’s relaxation of the arguably excessive and burdensome regulation of the private
sector. Far-reaching deregulation of Government
procurement is, in the final analysis, hostile to the
market and the good things it can provide us. It is,
therefore, entirely unlike recent and contemporary
efforts to deregulate aspects of the private sector.
To be sure, a strong and persuasive case has
been made in the last 15 years for moderate deregulation and significant reform of some aspects
of our Federal Government procurement system.
Indeed, it is important to affirm here that where
the Federal Government can make recourse to vigorously competitive private markets for genuinely
commercial goods and services to fulfill its needs,
the structured competitive process normally required by federal procurement law may be unnecessary. Indeed, in these circumstances, the procedural costs (including delays) entailed by the
traditional full and open competition procedures for
federal procurement appear to outweigh the incremental benefits of insisting on using that process
of structured competition. It is equally important
to acknowledge here that the market conditions
that justify a move away from the strictures and
burdens of full and open competition procedures are
far from rare. (On the other hand, they are also
far from universal!) Of course, there are costs in
any move away from a firm insistence on use of
fully competitive and fully transparent procurement
procedures. But those costs can be justified in situations where the use of more commercial practices
to secure goods and services in vigorously competi-

tive private markets can achieve the benefits of
competition with much less procedural cost. These
are the ideas that fueled the welcome (but imperfect) procurement system reforms of the 1990s.
Two insights are thus essential to reaching a sophisticated understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of our present hybrid procurement system,
particularly as it has developed since the implementation of the procurement reforms of the 1990s:
• There is a tradeoff between the cost of rigorously competitive procurement full and
open competition practices and the benefits
they attain for the public, and
• In appropriate circumstances, use of more
commercial procurement practices can produce a more favorable balance of costs and
benefits than full and open competition procedures.
The extremely complex hybrid system of Federal Government procurement that we now have
in effect in the U.S. embodies a spectrum of many
procedural models ranging from the highly deregulated to the highly regulated. At the deregulated
end of the spectrum we find purchases made with
Government-wide purchase cards for amounts that
fall under the micro-purchase threshold and also the
(multiplying) statutory authorizations for agency use
of other transactions authority. And at the other
end of the spectrum we find the classical default
regime, the requirements for full and open competition and transparency under the Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions implementing the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, and the Federal
Property and Administrative Services and Armed
Services Procurement Act.
Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum of
procurement procedures lie the simplified procedures for certain commercial products and services acquisitions and provisions for task order,
schedule and interagency contracting, and similar devices. At least if they are properly implemented to achieve their upside potential and to
minimize abuse, this last group of procedures represents a set of welcome procedural innovations
that seek to strike a balance between the cost
and the benefits of more and less rigid procedures
for federal procurement. This is not the place to
detail the abundant evidence that implementation
of these procedures has yet to achieve this optimal balance. For readers of this publication, it
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may be sufficient for now simply to recall the
tanker lease deal between the Air Force and
Boeing. See 46 GC ¶ 222(a), 46 GC ¶ 393 and 47
GC ¶ 269. These intermediate procedures should
be considered works in progress in need of ongoing tweaking to help them reach their potential
benefits.
There are pros and cons to the existence of the
complex system of multiple procurement modalities
that we have developed willy-nilly since the 1980s
and particularly in the last 15 years. While the procurement process under any given model (short of
the fully regulated transactions) may be quicker and
cheaper to administer, and may also produce good
substantive results when properly employed, the
system as a whole has grown in complexity. And
the federal acquisition workforce has failed to keep
pace, either quantitatively or qualitatively, with the
demands that the system as a whole places on Government procurement personnel. Choosing the
right set of procedures and using them properly has
become a daunting task in many situations.
FEMA’s recent efforts to outsource aspects of its
procurement responsibilities in order to respond to
the Hurricane Katrina situation are just the latest
piece of compelling evidence that procurement reform has exacerbated the significant problems of the
federal acquisition workforce. See Griff Whitte and
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., “Short-Staffed FEMA Farms
Out Procurement,” The Washington Post, Sept. 17,
2005, at D1- D2. Those problems besetting the federal acquisition workforce may indeed be, today, the
most substantial obstacle to achieving the potential of the procurement reforms of the 1990s.
But even if we were to fix these workforce problems, pervasive today, and secure procurement personnel qualified to steer procurements through the
complexities of the system correctly and expeditiously, the system remains problematic because
prescribing the right boundaries between different
levels and types of procurement is a difficult task
requiring wisdom and sensitive judgment for legislative and administrative policy makers. The
tradeoffs, noted above, between the costs and benefits of more or less competitive procedure, have
to be struck correctly for each class of procurement.
Whether we have achieved the optimal regime
in delineating the boundaries within which each
type of procurement process is to operate is far
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from certain. But what is certain is that we at
least attempted, in the 1990s and the first years
of this decade, to take our best shot at delineating where these boundaries should be to maintain
an optimal set of tradeoffs between the costs and
benefits of more rigorously competitive procedures
for procurement. Unless those judgments were
woefully mistaken, radical and precipitous rearrangements of these boundaries proposed today are
almost certain to produce costs that outweigh
their benefits.
Careful study might, on the other hand, reveal that
we have, by legislation and regulation, established
boundaries and tradeoffs that are suboptimal.
Tweaking of these boundaries to optimize the
tradeoffs struck in the procurement reforms of the
1990s appears to me to be the mission assigned to
the Acquisition Advisory Panel, on which I presently
am honored to serve, that was established by § 1423
of the Services Acquisition Reform Act provisions
of the Defense Authorization Act of 2004. That
panel is engaged in studying the present operation
of the system in order to make thoughtful and balanced recommendations as to how to optimize these
tradeoffs.
By contrast, hasty recasting of this complex system of procedures at the present juncture, without
waiting for the results of the ongoing study and
without a sophisticated appreciation of the considerable virtues and important values of the system
that we now have in place, appears to me to be imprudent and unwise.
The same can be said of the decision by Congress, two weeks ago, seizing on the Katrina emergency, to bump up the micro-purchase threshold
sharply, 100-fold, when long-awaited Office of Management and Budget guidance on the proper management of the Government purchase card had just
been issued and before it had even gone into effect.
Plainly, the awkward timing and ill-considered nature of that congressional decision produced in
near-record time a damage-limiting White House
response: the OMB Guidance Memorandum of Sept.
13, 2005, “Implementing Management Controls to
Support Increased Micro-purchase Threshold for
Hurricane Katrina Rescue and Relief Operations.”
See related story, 47 GC ¶ 401, this issue. That
memo takes back, with one hand, much of what
Congress improvidently had given, with the other,
less than a week earlier.
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Particularly disturbing in H.R. 3766 are proposals that would eliminate competition requirements for a vast amount of procurement that would
come into play when an emergency is invoked as
a reason for dispensing with full and open competition. These provisions would gut the procedural
safeguards that Congress deliberately erected in
1984 in CICA, including those designed to address
emergency procurement. I want to make it absolutely clear that I favor a striking degree of flexibility in procurement practice for disaster relief
operations. But there is no evidence that the existing system fails to offer just that. To be sure,
there is a distressing amount of evidence already
publicly available that procurement failures and
omissions by FEMA undermined disaster relief
and rescue operations, and made impossible
prompt provision to evacuees of essential goods
and services. But these extraordinary failures
seem to have entailed (1) a woefully inadequate
acquisition workforce and (2) a complete failure to
make effective use of task order and interagency
contracting to line up, in advance of a disaster, on
a competitive basis, and at a competitive price, contingency contracts for prompt provision of goods
and services such as drinking water, food, shelter, clothing, ambulances, emergency fuel supplies,
generators, body bags, and evacuation transportation services and vehicles. If we have learned anything from the procurement history of our present
efforts in Iraq, it should be that a lack of timely
acquisition planning is not conducive to achieving
best value for the Government. The procurement
history of Iraq also makes clear that a lack of flexible devices for emergency acquisition is not a
problem that our system has today.
Accordingly, there is no real need for radical
procurement deregulation to cope with the Katrina
emergency. The proposal to define a large and important class of transactions as commercial that are
not presently treated as such, thereby eliminating
transparency and integrity requirements and safeguards that apply in the system of full and open
competition, is also extremely troublesome. Of
course, there are substantial questions as to
whether we have drawn the lines between acquisitions of commercial goods and services and our default acquisition procedures in an optimal manner.
The present arrangements certainly should not be
regarded as sacrosanct. These precise questions

about optimizing our use of commercial goods and
services are among those being studied today by the
§ 1423 Acquisition Advisory Panel, presently due
to report in several months, in early 2006. On the
other hand, radically shifting the line between commercial and non-commercial acquisitions at the
present time, as the pending legislative proposal
would do for a significant class of Katrina-aftermath
acquisition, simply has not been justified.
Particularly disturbing is the proposal to simply redefine a class of purchases, not today defined
or treated as commercial, as just that. I am reminded of President Lincoln’s well-known exchange
with a visitor to the White House. Posing a riddle
to his visitor, Lincoln is reported to have asked: “If
you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog
have?” The visitor understandably replied that his
answer was “five legs.” Lincoln reputedly replied
that the visitor was “Wrong!” Explaining, Lincoln
noted that “calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.”
Likewise, simply labeling as “commercial” a
class of procurement that lies beyond the boundaries of the class of procurement so defined today
does not establish that the benefits of invoking the
commercial purchase model will, haphazardly, outweigh the costs of doing so (including the foregone
benefits of using a fully competitive model). Congress should look carefully before it leaps.
Finally, at the end of his comments, my colleague, Chris Yukins, raises the possibility that a
radical deregulation of procurement might be necessary to entice the private sector to participate in
the post-Katrina market for relief and reconstruction goods and services. Chris does not necessarily
conclude that this is so, but only identifies this as
a point worthy of more careful study. Indeed, it
seems clear that Chris is skeptical of the empirical
foundation of any such claim, as am I. In any event,
I certainly agree that careful consideration of any
such claim is warranted before Congress acts in reliance on this speculative and novel hypothesis.
At first glance, the hypothesis that radical deregulation is needed to entice contractors to participate in post-Katrina reconstruction contracting
is inherently implausible. It is precisely when the
Government creates a large and valuable set of business opportunities for would-be Government contractors that would not otherwise exist (with the
same magnitude and timing) that the procedural
burdens that the federal procurement system can
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impose on contractors will not operate as a significant barrier to entry to this lucrative marketplace.
The conditions, the economic opportunities and the
contractor interest that should make for a vigorous and competitive supply side are all likely to
be present on a historically unprecedented scale
in the market for reconstruction and rebuilding
services for New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. The
barrier-to-entry hypothesis thus seems almost
uniquely unpersuasive in this context. Congress
should accordingly think carefully before it jumps
on the bandwagon of the pending legislative proposals. At the very least, this would dictate waiting for the forthcoming recommendations of the
current Acquisition Advisory Panel, in the absence
of any compelling emergency that actually justifies abandoning either competition or transparency safeguards for the vast spending on postKatrina acquisition that is forthcoming. Existing
procurement law, coupled with the already overbroad provisions of the first round of post-Katrina
procurement “emergency reforms” related to the
micro-purchase threshold, makes more than adequate provision for emergency procurement, including, where justified, both non-competitive procurement and procurement under simplified
procedures.

✦
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Christopher R. Yukins
(cyukins@law.gwu.edu), associate professor of
Government contract law, and Joshua
Schwartz (jschwar@law.gwu.edu), professor of
law and co-director, Government procurement
law program, The George Washington University Law School.
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